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Draft Bill on debt restructuring plans for businesses in 
financial problems
■On 5 September 2017 a draft Bill introducing a new instrument to the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, ie a binding debt 
restructuring plan for creditors and shareholders of businesses in 
financial problems (in Dutch: Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord 
ter voorkoming van faillissement), was submitted by the Ministry of 
Security and Justice for public consultation. The Bill will enable 
a business that is facing financial problems to enter into a debt 
restructuring plan with some of its creditors and shareholders 
and, subject to certain requirements and safeguards, have this 
plan approved by the court and declared binding on all creditors 
and shareholders, including dissenting creditors and shareholders. 
The rationale underlying the Bill is to avoid the situation where a 
business which is still economically viable but which has too many 
debts becomes insolvent because a small number of creditors or 
shareholders refuses to consent to a debt restructuring plan. The 
public consultation closed on 1 December 2017. Several interested 
parties have provided their input to the Ministry. This input may 
be taken into consideration in the preparation of the Bill that will 
eventually be submitted to the Dutch Parliament.   
SUBMISSION OF A DEBT RESTRUCTURING PLAN
The draft Bill enables a business – either in the form of a company or of 
a private individual acting in a profession or trade – that runs the risk 
of becoming insolvent as a result of an overload of debt to propose a 
debt restructuring plan to all or some of its creditors and shareholders. 
The initiative to submit the plan may also be taken by a creditor. 
A creditor may ask the debtor to propose a restructuring plan. If the 
debtor refuses to do so, the creditor is entitled to request the court to 
appoint an expert to propose a plan. The draft Bill is not applicable to 
banks or insurers that are facing financial problems. It is a tool typically 
aimed at the rescue of ordinary commercial or industrial enterprises that 
are not subject to specific rules concerning insolvency, intervention or 
regulatory supervision.
The restructuring plan may impact on the rights of such creditors 
and shareholders. The plan can provide for a moratorium of payments 
or a partial release of the debtor from certain payment obligations. 
It can also provide for a write-down of certain liabilities or a conversion 
from debt into equity (cf the “bail-in” for banks as part of a resolution 
procedure). Another possible feature is an amendment of the terms 
of onerous contracts or of the debtor’s articles of association. It is also 
possible that recourse rights of sureties and co-debtors vis-à-vis the 
debtor will be affected. The same goes for the rights of creditors vis-à-
vis sureties and co-debtors of the debtor.
VOTING AND CREDITOR APPROVAL 
Only those creditors and shareholders whose rights are affected by the 
plan are entitled to vote on the plan. In addition, the draft Bill provides 
for the creation of different classes of creditors and shareholders for 
voting purposes. Creditors and shareholders whose rights are more or 
less similar will form part of the same class. Creditors and shareholders 
that would have a different ranking in bankruptcy will always be in 
different classes. 
A restructuring plan is adopted once it is approved by all classes. 
A plan is approved by a particular class of creditors if the creditors in 
the class that voted in favour of the plan represent at least two-thirds 
of the total amount of claims held by the voting creditors in that 
class. Similarly, a plan is approved by a class of shareholders if the 
shareholders in the class that voted in favour of the plan represent at 
least two-thirds of the total amount of the issued capital held by the 
voting shareholders in that class. 
COURT APPROVAL AND SAFEGUARDS 
If the plan is approved by at least one class, the debtor may request 
the court to approve the plan. If all classes have approved the plan, 
the court must declare the plan generally binding unless a ground for 
refusal applies. Grounds for refusal are, for instance, that compliance 
by the debtor with its obligations under the plan is not sufficiently 
safeguarded or that a creditor or shareholder would receive 
significantly less under the plan than it would receive if the debtor 
would be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. If one or 
more classes have voted against the plan, the court can nevertheless 
declare the plan generally binding. However, the court will refuse to 
do so if, under the plan, creditors or shareholders of a particular class 
will not be repaid in full while at the same time a lower ranking class 
will be entitled to some form of compensation. This will also be the 
case if creditors or shareholders of a particular class will not be repaid 
in full while at the same time creditors or shareholders of a higher 
ranking class will receive more than 100% of their claims or the 
nominal value of the shares. The court will also refuse to approve the 
plan if creditors or shareholders of a particular class will receive less 
than another class of creditors or shareholders with the same ranking 
or if creditors will be denied a payment in cash for the amount that 
they may reasonably expect to receive if the debtor would be wound 
up under normal insolvency proceedings. 
Court approval entails that the plan will become binding 
on all creditors and shareholders, including those creditors and 
shareholders (of the same class or a different class) who voted against 
the plan.
In addition to the safeguards for creditors and shareholders that 
are embodied in the voting thresholds and the obligation for a court 
to withhold its approval if one of the many grounds for refusal occurs, 
the court may take any measures it deems fit to safeguard adequately 
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the interests of the creditors and shareholders. With a view to the 
possibility that the debtor ends up in insolvency proceedings after 
all, the draft Bill contains a provision that protects lenders that 
prior to these insolvency proceedings have provided a loan to the 
debtor and obtained a right of pledge or mortgage on assets of the 
debtor to secure the repayment of such loan against an action by 
the insolvency trustee based on fraudulent conveyance. If it was 
the intention that this loan would be used for payments that were 
necessary to ensure the continuity of the debtor’s business within 
the framework of the restructuring plan, the draft Bill contains 
a rebuttable presumption that the vesting of these pledges and 
mortgage rights has not been fraudulent.
STAY AND FREEZE 
At the debtor’s request, the court can stay a petition for its 
insolvency for a period of up to four months or until a restructuring 
plan has been approved by the court. The court can also order 
a freeze and determine that any powers of third parties to take 
recourse against assets belonging to the debtor’s estate cannot be 
exercised during a period of up to four months to be determined 
by the court, except with the authorisation of the court. Cash and 
securities provided as collateral pursuant to a security financial 
collateral arrangement are exempted from the freeze. Although, 
taken literally, this exemption only pertains to security financial 
collateral arrangements governed by Dutch law, a Dutch court will, 
in our opinion, act analogously with respect to securities and  
cash provided as collateral under a foreign security financial 
collateral arrangement.
In the case of a traditional right of pledge, it is uncertain whether 
the freeze applies to securities deposited with a custodian or cash 
held in a bank account. The relevant provision in the draft Bill refers 
to a provision in the Bankruptcy Act dealing with a freeze in a 
suspension of payments procedure. The views expressed in legislative 
history on the scope of this provision have been contradictory as to 
the question of whether this provision applies to intangible assets. 
If the provision is merely aimed at freezing the rights of creditors 
in connection with movable and/or real property belonging to 
the estate, this would lead to the conclusion that the freeze is not 
applicable to financial collateral, except to the extent that this 
consists of bearer securities. If, however, the provision is applicable 
to securities or rights with respect thereto or cash, it would merely 
delay the exercise of the right of the pledgee to take recourse 
against the collateral (and thus expose the pledgee to the risk of the 
securities declining in value). 
MUTUAL CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTUAL 
COUNTERPARTY RIGHTS
A debtor may propose that the terms of mutual agreements that it 
has with its counterparties be amended. If a counterparty rejects 
such a proposal, the debtor has the right to terminate the agreement, 
subject to a maximum notice period of three months. The 
counterparty of the debtor is entitled to damages resulting from the 
amendment or the termination. The amount of these damages may 
be reduced or modified as part of the restructuring plan. 
The draft Bill contains a provision restricting the exercise of 
contractual counterparty rights. The mere proposing of a debt 
restructuring plan, and events directly linked thereto, shall 
not, per se, make it possible for a counterparty to exercise any 
termination, suspension or modification rights. This entails that  
ipso facto clauses pursuant to which creditors are entitled to 
terminate, suspend or amend a contract on the occurrence of the 
proposing of a debt restructuring plan will be without effect. 
PROS AND CONS
The draft Bill introduces an important instrument to restructure 
businesses which are facing financial problems but which are still 
economically viable. That is certainly a pro. 
The draft Bill does not contain explicit provisions to safeguard 
contractual netting and close-out rights contained in master 
agreements for financial transactions such as the ISDA Master 
Agreement for derivatives transactions. These rights could be affected 
as part of a restructuring plan, even if the counterparty were to vote 
against the restructuring plan. That is definitely a con. Although the 
court should not approve the debt restructuring plan if as a result the 
counterparty would receive significantly less than it would receive if 
the debtor were to be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, 
it would in our view be advisable that it be made clear in the draft 
Bill that netting and close-out rights of creditors under such master 
agreements may not be affected in such a way that a counterparty 
would be worse off than in an insolvency situation or that an explicit 
safeguard for netting and close-out rights be included. With such 
a provision it may be possible to avoid concerns with financial 
counterparties that need to rely on netting and collateral enforceability 
for regulatory capital purposes.  
The draft Bill also restricts the exercise of contractual netting 
and close-out rights under such master agreements. It provides that 
the mere proposing of a debt restructuring plan and events directly 
linked thereto, shall not, per se, make it possible for a counterparty 
to exercise any termination, suspension or modification rights. 
The proposing of a debt restructuring plan is likely to be covered 
by the definition of an event of default in such a master agreement.  
However, it is also likely that netting and close-out rights qualify 
as termination rights and are thus caught by this provision. The 
prohibition is drafted in such a way that it suggests that such rights 
can be exercised if the debtor has ceased to perform any substantive 
obligations under the contract, including payment and delivery 
obligations and provision of collateral, but that is not clear from the 
draft Bill nor from the explanatory memorandum thereto. That is 
also definitely a con.  
A pro is that cash and securities provided as collateral pursuant 
to a security financial collateral arrangement are exempt from 
the freeze. A con is that this exemption may not extend to master 
agreements for financial transactions pursuant to which the 
providing of collateral is not inherent.  n
